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1Abstract
Voluntary opt-in programs to reduce emissions in unregulated sectors or countries have
spurred considerable discussion. Since any regulator will make errors in predicting baselines
and participants will self-select into the program, adverse selection will reduce eciency and
possibly environmental integrity. In contrast, pure subsidies lead to full participation but require
large nancial transfers. We present a simple model to analyze this trade-o between adverse
selection and infra-marginal transfers. We nd that increasing the scale of voluntary programs
both improves eciency and reduces transfers. We show that discounting (paying less than
full value for osets) is inecient and cannot be used to reduce the fraction of osets that
are spurious while setting stringent baselines generally can. Both approaches reduce the cost
to the osets buyer. The eects of two popular policy options are less favorable than many
believe: Limiting the number of osets that can be one-for-one exchanged with permits in a
cap-and-trade system will lower the oset price but also quality. Trading ratios between osets
and allowances have ambiguous environmental eects if the cap is not properly adjusted. This
paper frames the issues in terms of avoiding deforestation but the results are applicable to any
voluntary oset program.
Keywords: deforestation, osets, adverse selection, REDD, climate change policy, opt-in.
21 Introduction
Many reports (e.g. Stern, 2006) and key policy makers assert that avoiding deforestation is a key
short-run climate mitigation option because of the apparently low abatement costs (Kindermann
et al., 2008). Melillo et al. (2009) and Wise et al. (2009) both show that it is critically important
to price carbon in forests, especially if there are positive incentives for biofuels. Current estimates
of the forest carbon supply curve are based on either land use responses to commodity prices1, or
on estimates of the opportunity cost of land (e.g. Kindermann et al., 2006). These approaches
do not take into account the diculty of designing eective policies to address deforestation in
developing countries, where most deforestation occurs (e.g. Andam et al., 2008; Pfa et al., 2007).
They assume the application of ecient price-based policies, yet these are hard to achieve. Oset
programs have been shown to suer from serious problems of spurious osets and low eectiveness
as a result of adverse selection.2
This paper formally models voluntary price-based policy to avoid deforestation, examining the
implications of three key policy levers, project scale, price (\discounting" or trading ratios3), and
baseline stringency on the policy's economic, environmental and distributional performance. We
consider three inter-related specic criteria: eciency is determined by whether land goes to its
optimal use - land that yields high agricultural or timber returns should be cleared; land with
returns lower than the positive environmental externalities from the forest should not;4 value is
concerned with the average cost to industrialized countries of climate mitigation through avoided
deforestation; quality of osets is measured as the percentage of osets that are not spurious. If
quality is not taken into account through a more ambitious cap or fund it will reduce 'environmental
integrity' (dened as the degree to which real global environmental gains are achieved as a result
of the policy).5
We use a microeconomic model of land use with a combination of analytical results and nu-
merical simulations to show that (1) baseline uncertainty in a voluntary program leads to reduced
1Examples include Kerr et al. (2002) for econometric estimates of transition to agricultural land use in response to
prices, the MIT EPPA global general equilibrium model as used in Melillo et al. (2009), or Sathaye et al. (2006) for
a partial equilibrium approach.
2Adverse selection is caused by a combination of two factors: a voluntary element (i.e., agents can choose whether
or not to opt in to the program) and asymmetric information about the baseline (i.e., the agents know more about
their true baseline than the regulator). Montero (2000), Fischer (2005) and Arguedas and van Soest (2009) establish
theoretical results for the eects of adverse selection on osets programs. Montero (1999) gives the rst empirical
evidence in the case of the US acid rain program. He and Morse (2010) and Millard-Ball (2010) explore similar issues
in the energy sector for the Clean Development Mechanism and for sectoral transportation caps respectively.
3In our model lowering the price is equivalent to requiring a trading ratio when osets are used in a cap-and-trade
system in which the cap can be adjusted to achieve the same global abatement. A 5:1 trading ratio is an 80% price
discount.
4Higher eciency will be associated with more avoided deforestation up to a limit. Avoided deforestation may also
be of independent interest because of associated benets such as ood protection, water quality and biodiversity.
5A lower quality of oset also has equity implications because a higher share of the gains from mitigation will go to
actors who have not really mitigated.
3eciency and spurious osets, but increasing the required scale of projects that can participate mit-
igates these problems; (2) 'discounting' osets reduces the quality of osets and reduces eciency
but generally lowers payments per hectare; therefore, the only rationale for oset discounting is
to increase the value to industrialized countries per dollar of transfers to oset sellers; (3) more
stringent baselines also reduce eciency but generally improve the quality of osets while also
improving value for money.
Actual price-based policies for climate mitigation in developing countries are still mostly limited
to oset programs. Examples include the payments for ecosystem services program in Costa Rica
(Sanchez et al., 2007) and the Clean Development Mechanism, where actors are given credit for
forest remaining above an estimated and assigned baseline, or for emission reductions below a
baseline. Several designs have been proposed for an international program to reduce deforestation.6
Some are beginning to be implemented on a wider scale - notably Norway's innovative contracts
with Guyana, Brazil and Indonesia.7 All proposed policies have elements of osets in their design
and face a tradeo between eciency and the desire of the funders of such programs to get the best
value for the money they spend.8 It has been suggested that programs should discount the price
per hectare paid to landowners, or increase their assigned baseline, to "correct" for spurious osets
and the resulting loss of environmental integrity.
Our paper can be interpreted as an analysis of either adding avoided deforestation to a broader
cap-and-trade market, or as an international fund used to pay for avoided deforestation to supple-
ment a separate cap on other emissions. Both programs involve a baseline level of forest and provide
rewards relative to that. In a cap-and-trade market these rewards would be osets valued at the
market price, whereas in the fund these rewards would be dollars. In both programs industrialized
countries pay for the reductions that are achieved in developing countries. These two approaches
are equivalent under the following assumptions. First, the rewards must be the same per unit of
avoided deforestation. To set fund payouts that meet this assumption requires that the aggregate
marginal cost functions of the forest landowners are known so that the market price in the cap-
and-trade system can be predicted accurately. Second, the cap-and-trade market emissions cap and
the level of the fund can be adjusted so that regardless of which approach is used, both the global
environmental outcome and the permit price are identical. That is, the fund level would need to
be set such that the environmental gains it achieved were equal to the dierence in environmental
6These eorts are most recently referred to as REDD - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation.
A plethora of reports and edited volumes explore the issues associated with the design of REDD and its successor
REDD+. See Angelsen (2008), Chomitz (2007), Plantinga and Richards (2008) for recent discussions of the challenges.
Strand (2010) points out that oset programs can lead to increased emissions in the short run from countries that
have not yet opted in, but use lax environmental standards to increase their baseline emissions.
7For example see Government of Kingdom of Norway and Government of the Republic of Indonesia (2010).
8Several studies provide evidence on the eciency eects of adverse selection in the context of Costa Rican deforestation
(Kerr et al., 2004; Robalino et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2007). Busch et al. (2009) focus on the global eciency
eects of dierent baselines (reference levels) in a deforestation program. Wara and Victor (2008) explore the extent
of spurious credits in the Clean Development Mechanism.
4gains between the environmental cap of the larger broad cap and trade system (including avoided
deforestation) and the original cap and trade market (excluding avoided deforestation).9
Our presentation focuses on deforestation but the results are equally applicable to many other
internationally funded mitigation options in developing countries, as well as wider applications of
voluntary oset programs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of
voluntary deforestation policy that operates rst at the level of individual plots, and then for larger
scales. This demonstrates the trade-o between eciency loss from adverse selection and the level
of transfers, and analyzes how the three policy criteria are aected by the shapes of the distributions
of land returns and observation errors. Section 3 discusses how the potential objectives are aected
by three dierent policy choices: increasing the scale required for participation, changing the carbon
payment (equivalent to \discounting osets") and changing the generosity of the assigned baseline.
Section 4 concludes and summarizes the main policy implications.
2 A Simple Model of Voluntary Opt-In
2.1 Ecient subsidies versus baselines with adverse selection
Consider a continuum of plots of forested land, indexed by i. Decisions on each plot are independent.
Landowners decide to either clear fully or keep the forest. Landowners will clear their forest if the net
return from deforesting ri (e.g. agricultural plus timber revenues minus clearing costs) exceeds any
payment pc to maintain forest. Landowner i knows ri with certainty. The marginal environmental
externality from deforestation is dened as .10 Returns ri are distributed across i with density fr.
The simplest policy would be to oer a subsidy equal to pc per plot that remains forested, where
pc = . All landowners with ri  pc will accept the subsidy and not deforest but only landowners
with 0  ri  pc will actually change their behavior; landowners with ri > pc will (eciently)
9Suppose industrialized countries (ICs) have a joint emissions cap that requires them to undertake abatement of A.
Total abatement cost (TAC) is the integral under the IC marginal abatement cost curve up to A. The market price
of pollution equals p
. ICs could use the fund to achieve n further units of abatement (and pay for m infra-marginal,
or \spurious", units), at price per unit pc which may be lower than p
. Total global abatement would be A + n,
where n is a function of pc.
Analogous to the fund, ICs could purchase n+m osets from developing countries (DCs) at price pc. This, however,
would not be a fair comparison. Under the fund, the global abatement equals A + n. Using osets, and with no
trading ratio, global abatement will be A   m. The environmental outcome is worse than without osets (and pc
would be lower). To correct this, ICs must increase their joint abatement target to A + n + m. This ensures that,
after n+m osets are purchased from DCs, the IC mitigation eort is back at A and the pollution price at p
. Global
abatement is now also A + n.
If a trading ratio t : 1 is applied, under osets global abatement will be A + (t   1)n   m, where n and m are now
functions of t. This could be higher or lower than A + n. Again an adjustment to the joint abatement target would
be needed to make them equivalent.
10We implicitly assume that the amount of carbon per hectare of forest is constant. This could be relaxed with no loss
of generality.
5deforest.11 The change in economic surplus Seff from this ecient policy relative to no policy
equals
Efficiency gain = Seff =
Z pc
0
(pc   r)fr (r)dr (1)
This achieves ecient deforestation but requires a large transfer of resources




The total amount of avoided deforestation is




The average cost (AC = TT=AD) to industrialized countries of climate mitigation through
avoided deforestation summarizes the value of the program to ICs. Under the subsidy, the value is
low (average cost is high) if many plots of land have negative returns and so would not have been
cleared even without the subsidy.
To avoid large transfers, a second policy option is a voluntary deforestation program that will pay
participants an amount pc for each hectare of forest exceeding an assigned baseline.12 Landowners
know their true forest baselines BLi:
BLi =
(
1 if ri  0
0 if ri > 0
)
(4)
If the regulator observes ri, the ecient solution is achieved by assigning each landowner i the
true baseline BLi(ri). If BLi = 1 (no deforestation), no payment will be made and the forest will
remain intact. If BLi = 0 (full deforestation) and 0  ri  pc, the landowner will opt in and choose
not to deforest. If BLi = 0 and ri > pc, the landowner will deforest and forego the payment pc. If
11The ri may be interdependent. General equilibrium eects mean one landowner's decision whether to deforest will
alter returns for others. This could operate through leakage where a landowner who does not deforest reduces supply
of timber and/or food which aect prices for those. It could also occur if clearing involves investment in local
infrastructure, or induces local service provision or labor supply that make clearing more attractive for neighboring
parcels. These eects could also occur if a local government is the entity avoiding deforestation. For example, a
farmer education program to raise yields on existing crop land with a new technology or practice could spill over
to more intensive production in neighboring communities if the information spreads. This could either increase or
decrease ri. fr could be thought of as an ex-post distribution of returns when a new set of equilibrium land uses is
reached.
12If it were practically feasible, a policy that sets pc = ri would reduce transfers even further. In a recent paper, Mason
and Plantinga (2010) describe a model in which the regulator has the option to provide landowners with a menu
of two-part contracts, which consist of a lump-sum payment from the landowner to the regulator and a \per unit
of forest" back to the landowner. Under certain conditions, these are type-revealing, where an ex-ante unobserved
\type" corresponds to a marginal opportunity cost curve of keeping a fraction of the land forested. A similar approach
to maximize the benets to the developed country funders in an environmental transfer program was developed in
Kerr (1995). Our model does not consider this option.
6pc = , the remaining deforestation is ecient. Eciency and avoided deforestation are the same
as in (1) and (3) but the total transfer is lower by the amount in (5) and hence the average cost
(value) is lower (higher). This policy dominates the subsidy if transfers are costly.




In practice, however, the regulator cannot observe ri, but instead observes b ri = ri + "i. The
observation error "i has density f"  (0;"), is assumed to be symmetric around 0 and independent
of fr. The predicted baselines are
d BLi =
(
1 if b ri  0
0 if b ri > 0
)
(6)
What happens if the government assigns baseline d BLi? When (ri > 0;b ri > 0) or (ri  0;b ri  0),
the assigned baseline coincides with the true baseline. The landowner will make the socially ecient
decision. However, if (ri > 0;b ri  0), the assigned baseline is 1 but the true baseline is 0. The
landowner would have deforested the plot in the true baseline, but gets assigned an unfavorable
\no deforestation" baseline. Hence, the landowner will not participate in the scheme. This leads to
an eciency loss if 0  ri  pc = , since the landowner will now deforest while he would not have
done so had his baseline been correctly assigned and he had participated in the scheme. Relative





















Finally, consider the case where (ri  0;b ri > 0). These landowners would have kept their forest,
but now get assigned a full deforestation baseline. This will not aect their behavior, but it implies
an additional infra-marginal transfer pc. The total transfer (TT) is now lower than the subsidy
amount (2). TT is given by the sum of marginal transfers (MT) and infra-marginal transfers (IT).
The former are the payments made to landowners that change their decision as a result of the
policy and do not deforest. The latter are payments to landowners that would not have deforested
without the policy, but get assigned a favorable full deforestation baseline and will therefore opt
7in.13



















The amount of avoided deforestation is reduced relative to both the subsidy and the full infor-
mation voluntary program (both given by (3)). Total transfers are lower than under the subsidy
(2), but can be either higher or lower than under the full information program (5).14 The eect
of adverse selection on average cost is theoretically ambiguous relative to the subsidy but clearly
higher relative to the full information voluntary program.



































where OS denotes the amount of infra-marginal forest credited, or osets that are \spurious".
Moving from a subsidy to a voluntary program reduces OS but also lowers AD. For most realistic
distributions (described in Section 2.2) the reduction in OS is larger than the reduction in AD, so
AC would fall. We use the fraction of osets that are spurious (FOS = OS=AD) as a measure of
the oset quality. The cases described above are summarized in Figure 1.
2.2 The impacts of observation error distributions on policy objectives
The tradeo between eciency and value depends on the distributions of observation errors. We
now analyze the impact of observation error variance on our three policy objectives: economic
eciency, value (AC) and oset quality (FOS; a measure of the environmental integrity of the
program).
Equation (7) shows that any change in f"(") that increases the probability mass in the range
[ 1; ri], where 0  ri  pc, will increase the eciency loss from adverse selection (assuming
pc = ) and decrease avoided deforestation. A mean preserving spread such that F0
"(x)  F"(x)
8x < 0 is sucient. If the distribution of errors is normal, an increase in variance will generate
such a mean preserving spread.
13In a cap-and-trade program, infra-marginal transfers would be spurious or non-additional credits.
14From (2) and (9), it follows trivially that TT(baseline) < TT(subsidy). However, TT(baseline) is unsigned relative
to TT(full information), because IT(baseline) > IT(full information) = 0, but MT(baseline) < MT(full
information). Generally, TT(baseline) > TT(full information). However, if, for example, fr(r) has no density






regardless of assigned 
baseline
Landowner should not 
deforest, but will if 
assigned baseline equals 1
Landowner will not 
deforest, regardless of 
assigned baseline
Landowner may receive 
payment with no 
behavioral change
Figure 1
(No deforestation) (Full deforestation)
Figure 1: Adverse selection causes eciency loss in the range 0  ri  pc = . It increases average
cost in the range ri  0. Both are caused by assigning landowners in these ranges an incorrect
baseline.
Under the same assumptions and for f() symmetric around 0, AC will increase.15 More
landowners with ri < 0 will now get assigned d BLi = 0 and receive the payment pc, but they do not
provide additional deforestation and funders pay more for less benet.
Numerical illustration
To provide more intuition for the results, we now assume a parametric form for the distribution
of net agricultural returns fr(r) on forested land and the baseline prediction error f"("). In the
remainder of this paper, we will focus mostly on return distributions fr(r) for which Fr(0) > 0:5
and that are downward sloping at 0. The rst assumption reects the reality in key countries that
most forested land is not at risk of deforestation. Landowners have previously chosen not to clear
the remaining forest so only land on which relative returns have recently risen will still be forested
but be at risk of clearing. The second assumption implies that there is a higher probability mass























"(r)fr (r)dr  (by the mean preserving spread)
0 R
 1
F"(r)fr (r)dr = OS(f"). Since AD decreases
and OS increases, AC increases.
9for returns just below zero than for returns just above zero, which intensies the tradeo between
eciency and reducing transfers and, in particular, infra-marginal rewards.
With no shocks, all land with positive returns would already have been cleared without any
policy while no land with negative returns would have been cleared. Hence, there will be positive
probability mass below zero and no mass above zero and the assumption trivially holds. Deforesta-
tion occurs because the returns distribution shifts over time. If this shift, driven by, for example,
technology and local infrastructure change, has both a common and an idiosyncratic (e.g. normal
unbiased shock to each plot) element we would still expect the second assumption to hold.16 The
density above zero will tend to be lower than below zero, since the tail of the normal distribution
implies a negative slope.
We consider fr(r)  N( 1;1), f"(")  N(0;") and pc =  = 0:5 as our central case. Figure 2
plots the various policy objectives as a function of the standard deviation of the observation error
": the eciency loss from adverse selection (7) relative to potential eciency (1), AC and FOS.
Naturally, the eciency loss is 0 if the observation error standard deviation " = 0. The
eciency loss is increasing in ". As " grows large the assignment of baselines becomes random.
Participation, eciency and avoided deforestation all fall toward 50% of their maxima (at " = 0).
Figure 1 shows that eciency losses only result from landowners with 0  ri  . These will make
the inecient decision to deforest if and only if they get assigned d BLi = 1, which happens with
probability approaching 0.5 as " increases. Figure 1 also shows that osets that are spurious are
given out only to those with ri < 0. As " increases from zero, the fraction of osets that are
spurious rises rapidly. Combined, the fall in AD and rise in FOS have dramatic implications for
AC: AC quickly rises from the ecient value of 0.5 (the environmental externality ), as FOS
becomes large. For " of 0.3, AC doubles and 50% of the osets are spurious.
This section has shown that a mean preserving spread that increases the tails of the observation
error distribution (which in a normal distribution would be implied by an increased variance)
unambiguously has (weakly) negative eects on all three policy objectives. Any improvement in
our ability to observe returns, or equivalently predict deforestation, would reduce the tradeo
between eciency and transfers.
2.3 The impact of dierent marginal costs of avoiding deforestation on policy
objectives
How do the policy objectives depend on marginal abatement cost? While this is largely a function
of geography and economic factors and so not easily aected by international deforestation policy,
it will inuence where eorts to develop programs to avoid deforestation will be most eective. In
16The common shock will generate a probability mass of forested land above zero return up to the size of the shock;
the idiosyncratic shock will also move some land to higher returns (and some to lower) leaving lower probability mass
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Figure 2: Eciency loss, AC and FOS as a function of observation error standard deviation "
(pc =  = 0:5).
this model, abatement costs are represented by the foregone net return from deforestation r and
the marginal abatement cost curve depends on the distribution fr(r).
We rst consider which distributions fr(r) lead to the largest eciency gain from voluntary
avoided deforestation policy. We abstract from observation errors and adverse selection for now.
The eciency gain relative to no policy (1) depends on fr(r) through two eects. First, a higher
probability mass of returns between [0;] increases the ecient level of AD. Second, a higher
probability mass of very small positive returns between [0; << ] relative to returns between
[   ;] increases eciency. Therefore, the rst condition is not sucient for an overall eciency
gain.
Figure 3 illustrates this by using three dierent returns distributions to generate returns dis-
tributions that imply dierent marginal abatement cost curves. As the distribution changes from
case 1 (N( 1;0:5)) to case 2 (N( 1;1)), fr increases for all r between [0;]. This increases the
11deforestation response at every positive price, by unambiguously lowering marginal abatement cost,
and hence increases the eciency gain of the policy. The eciency gain increases fourfold, while
AD increases vefold. However, moving from case 2 to case 3 (Uniform( 3:6;1:6)), fr increases
for r close to , but decreases for small r. AD increases by seven percent, but the eciency gain
decreases by three percent. Hence, the relationship between avoided deforestation and the potential
eciency gain is ambiguous.
Figure 3






Case 1: σr = 0.5
Case 2: σr = 1.0
Case 3: uniform
δ
Notes: case 1: fr(r)  N( 1;0:5); case 2: fr(r)  N( 1;1); case 3:
fr(r)  Uniform( 3:6;1:6).  = pc = 0:5. f"(")  N(0;0:5).
Figure 3: The ambiguous relationship between returns distributions, avoided deforestation and
eciency.
Proposition 1. A returns distribution fr that generates more AD at pc =  than f0
r does not
necessarily generate a higher eciency gain.
Proof. By counterexample (Figure 3).17
17A more general counterexample can be constructed as follows. Consider a distribution fr that is downward sloping in
the interval r 2 [0;pc = ], and a distribution f
0
r such that f
0
r = fr(pc r) for this interval and f
0
r(r) = fr(r) elsewhere








fr (pc   r)dr =
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0
fr (r)dr. Second, since
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 r
f" (")d" is increasing




















fr (r)dr = AD (fr). For example, consider f()) 

















































fr (r)dr = S (fr), since f
0
r(r) is increasing in r while fr(r) is decreasing in r and f
0
r(0) =
fr(pc). Hence, AD can increase while eciency decreases.
12Note that sucient conditions for eciency to increase are f0








fr (r)dr 8r 2 [0;pc = ].
Proposition 1 shows that stronger assumptions on fr and f0
r are needed to ensure an increase
in eciency than an increase in AD: an increase in the (observation error-weighted) probability
mass between [0;] is sucient for AD to increase, but not to guarantee increased eciency. In
other words, a return distribution that leads to a higher amount of optimal avoided deforestation
does not necessarily lead to a greater increase in eciency.
With observation errors, a change in the returns distribution also aects the likelihood of
spurious osets: a less negatively (more positively) sloped distribution around zero yields fewer
spurious osets. The combined eects on AD and spurious osets determine the eect on AC.
Numerical illustration
Figure 4 illustrates these eects using a numerical example similar to the previous one with
fr(r)  N( 1;r), f"(")  N(0;"), " = 0:5, pc =  = 0:5 and three dierent r which alter
the relevant part of fr(r). Case 3 now corresponds to a N( 1;2) returns distribution. Marginal
abatement cost unambiguously falls between case 1 and 2 while in case 3 it is higher than 2 for
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Figure 4: Impact of changing fr(r) on the policy objectives, with pc =  = 0:5 and " = 0:5.
13Moving from case 1 to case 2 unambiguously raises eciency and lowers AC. This follows from
the statement below Proposition 1, since f0
r(r) > fr(r) for all r between [0;]. It corresponds to
a downward movement in the marginal cost curve. The fraction of osets that are spurious also
falls from 91% to 67%. In contrast, moving from case 2 to case 3, eciency falls slightly; AC
does also. The probability mass of returns between [0;] decreases slightly, limiting the potential
eciency gains and AD. The distribution becomes almost at in the region [0;]. This means that
the density close to zero (where abatement costs are low) falls relative to the density close to 
(where abatement costs are high). This atness however also means that the ratio of land with
returns at risk of infra-marginal payments (r just below 0) to returns with potential eciency gains
(r between [0;]) is lower: the fraction of spurious osets keeps decreasing (from 67% to 57%), as
does AC.
A shift in the returns distribution that implies consistently lower marginal abatement costs
in the relevant price range and reduces the density of returns just below zero relative to those
above zero will improve eciency, value (reduced AC) and quality (lower FOS). Governments
may try to achieve such a shift in the return distribution (as perceived by landowners) by adopting
policies complementary to the voluntary program that address information failures or non-carbon
externalities and hence increase the attractiveness of keeping low productivity land forested (e.g. for
tourism, or a sustainable form of selective logging) or that reduce the attractiveness of agriculture
on marginal land (Angelsen, 2010).
3 The Impact of Policy Choices
Governments have several policy options at their disposal to design a voluntary avoided deforesta-
tion program. We analyze three policy options: increasing the project scale, oset price discounting
and changing the assigned forest baseline.
3.1 Policy 1: increasing the project scale
A rst policy to consider is to increase the scale of each project. So far, we have considered a small-
scale policy in which landowners get assigned plot-specic baselines and can opt in separately with
each individual plot. While some forest carbon programs in practice are indeed small-scale, other
proposals feature baselines for larger areas (e.g., a region or a country).18 Larger programs devolve
responsibility for changing individual landowners' behavior from the industrialized country oset
buyer to large local entities that may, in addition to the benets of scale discussed in this section,
have more authority and better information to enable ecient developing country policy. Section 2
18The Costa Rican Payments for Ecosystems services program is an example of a small scale sys-
tem. Norway's recent performance based agreement with Brazil sets up a large scale system:
http://www.norway.org/ARCHIVE/policy/environment/regnskogen i brasil en/
14showed that observation errors in voluntary programs reduce eciency and avoided deforestation,
value and quality. This section shows that increasing the required scale of each project in the
program mitigates these adverse consequences.
3.1.1 A multiple-plot model
We now consider a single entity (a large landowner or alternatively, a region or country) which
controls N 1-hectare plots. Each plot j has a return from deforestation rj. We initially assume
that these returns are distributed i.i.d. over plots with density fr. Without the program, the entity




BLj where BLj =
(
1 if rj  0
0 if rj > 0
)
(11)
The government observes each rj with error "j: b rj = rj + "j. Assume that "j is i.i.d. across
j. This means that b rj has a distribution with mean r and variance 2
r + 2
". The distribution
of b rj is more dispersed than fr(r). The government could compute an unbiased prediction of the
baseline d BLN as the sum of the expectation of the random variables for the plot-specic baselines.
From its point of view, the true baseline for a specic plot is a Bernoulli random variable with
mean p1i and variance p1i(1   p1i), where p1i = Pr(rj < 0jb rj) = Pr(BLj = 1jb rj).19 Since these














p1j (1   p1j)
1
A (12)
where d BLN is a cumulative baseline for all N plots.
3.1.2 Increasing scale and eciency
With the N-plot baseline, the entity that controls the area (which could be a local or national
government) must decide whether or not to opt in with his entire forest area, or not participate.
The dierence with the single-plot model is illustrated by Figure 5.
Figure 5 contrasts the single plot with the multiple plot case. In the single plot case, an
ineciency occurs when the true baseline is 0, but the government assigns a baseline of 1. In the
19Note that p1i 6= Pr(b rj < 0), except if fr(r) is symmetric around zero. If the government naively assumed that r and
b r have the same distribution, it would calculate p1i = F"( b rj) = (if f" is symmetric) 1   F"(b rj). This would lead to
a biased estimate of the baseline. Consider fr(r)  N( 1;1) and f"(")  N(0;1). In that case, fb r(b r)  N( 1;2).
The probability that b r > 0 exceeds the probability that the true return r > 0. Therefore, if the government used a
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Figure 5: Single versus multiple plot policy.
multi-plot case, assigning a more favorable baseline (d BLN < BLN) will lead to guaranteed opt-in
and infra-marginal payments. However, if ((d BLN > BLN), the entity has two options. If it opts in,
it will clear all plots with returns exceeding pc = , but forego clearing plots with returns between
0 and pc. Let Npc be the number of plots with r < pc. Hence, opting in is favorable if and only if
pc







Hence, for some assigned baselines d BLN, the entity will still opt in, but for assigned baselines
exceeding a threshold value, the entity will opt out with all of its N plots. There are cases in which
scale increases eciency: even if the baseline is too stringent, the entity will still opt in with all N
plots. Hence, all plots with returns between 0 and pc will remain forested. This leads to a higher
eciency gain than plot-specic baselines, in which some plots with returns between 0 and pc will
get assigned a baseline equal to 1, and opt out. However, in some cases the eciency of the new
system is lower than with plot-specic baselines. This happens when the baseline is so unfavorable
that the entity opts out with all N plots. In the single plot program, some critical plots with returns
between 0 and pc will receive correct baseline and some deforestation will be eciently avoided.
By the law of large numbers, as N ! 1;=
d BLN
N ! BLN
N : the standard error of the average
baseline per plot goes to zero. However, the standard error of d BLN does not converge to zero.
16Therefore, it is possible that the entity gets assigned a baseline that it so unfavorable that it
decides to opt out with all N plots. Since this standard error only grows at rate
p
n while the
expected benet from program participation grows at rate n, the probability of opt-in approaches
1 as N ! 1 and the ecient solution will be obtained.
In the limit, larger scale will lead to the same ecient outcome as under the full information
voluntary program. However, real-world programs can only be scaled up to a nite number of
plots.20 We therefore explore the eects of moderate increases in scale numerically in the next
section.
3.1.3 Numerical simulations of increased scale
This section presents numerical simulations to illustrate the dierences between a single-plot versus
a multiple plot program. Throughout this section, we assume f"(")  N(0;0:5), unbiased assigned
baselines (E[(d BLN] = BLN), and pc =  = 0:5. The central case returns distribution is fr(r) 
N( 1;1), but we also consider alternative distributions. Table 1 demonstrates what happens to
the policy objectives as N increases.
Table 1: The impact of increasing the required project scale: fr(r)  N( 1;1).
1-plot 2-plot 10-plot 100-plot Maximum eciency:
" = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Eciency gain 1.33 1.42 1.82 2.47 2.53
AC 0.91 0.87 0.68 0.51 0.50
FOS 45.29% 42.53% 26.83% 1.86% 0%
AD 5.34 5.54 6.60 8.95 9.18
TT 4.88 4.82 4.51 4.56 4.59
Opt-in 4.88% 18.30% 58.42% 97.47% 100%
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions.  =
pc = 0:5. f"(")  N(0;0:5). Eciency gains, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots.
Assigned baselines are unbiased.
Table 1 shows that increasing the project scale has dramatic consequences for its performance.
For the central case, N-plot baselines increase eciency and AD and reduce AC as N increases.
20The next section illustrates that, for nite N and certain unusual land return distributions, it is possible that eciency
initially decreases with N.
17100 plots are enough to approach the ecient solution. The reason is that the observation error nor-
malized per plot decreases as N grows, and the probability of opt-in becomes very high (97.47%).21
This high opt-in rate signals eciency though Table 1 shows that most gains are achieved through
the rst 5% of plots that participate. Hence, scale mitigates adverse selection for the central case
returns distribution.
The central case returns distribution reects that in most developing countries, the majority
of the forested land is not at threat of deforestation, at least in the short to medium run. Still,
we test the robustness of the result by analyzing the eects of project scale for two other return
distributions: a N(0;1) distribution (which implies that 50% of the forest will be cleared absent
any policy) and a symmetric bimodal normal BMN(0:5;0:1) distribution with modes at -0.5 and
0.5 and standard deviation r = 0:1. The latter distribution is unlikely to represent reality, but
illustrates that - for nite N - eciency does not monotonically increase in N.
Figure 6 summarizes the eects on eciency and FOS of increasing project scale and compares
it to the ecient (" = 0) solution. For the N(0;1) distribution, the eects are similar to the central
case distribution. Both eciency and FOS improve with scale. The BMN(0:5;0:1) distribution
demonstrates that increasing scale does not monotonically increase eciency for all distributions.
The intuition is that there are many plots with returns around pc =  (as well as returns close to
 ). Therefore, the BMN(0;5;0:1) distribution has many realizations for which (13) holds only
if the baseline is correct or more favorable. A slight baseline error will cause the entity to opt out
with all N plots. This eect dominates for small N: AD and eciency decrease with N between N
= 1 and 10. However, such distributions are highly stylized and unlikely to represent true returns
distributions. Average cost and the fraction of osets that are spurious decreases with scale in each
case although they are also theoretically ambiguous for nite N.22
We now test the robustness of these conclusions in another way. An important assumption has
been that fr(r) and f"(") are i.i.d: both returns and observation errors are independent across
plots. In reality, there may be a high degree of spatial correlation in both returns and errors. We
introduce spatial correlation across plots in the following stylized way:
rj = rrj 1 + ur
"j = ""j 1 + u"
(14)
where ur and u" are i.i.d. with variances 2
ur and 2




21In some realizations, landowners eciently opt out: their return exceeds .
22Consider the following example with three plots. For plot 1: BL = 1, d BL = 0 (spurious oset). For plot 2: BL = 0,
d BL = 1 and r < pc = . For plot 3: BL = 0 and d BL = 0 and r < pc = . Under a single-plot policy, 1 and 3 opt
in, leading to 1 spurious credit and 1 real oset. Now consider a policy in which the participation decision needs to
be made for plots 2 and 3 together; plot 1 remains standalone. Under this larger-scale policy, plots 2 and 3 get an
assigned baseline d BL2 = 1. If r2 + r3 > pc, the entity will opt out with both plots. Plot 1 still opts in. This means
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Figure 6: The impact on eciency (left panel) and FOS (right panel) of increasing the project




"). Table 2 summarizes the main ndings for the central case.23
Table 2 shows that as the correlation across plots and errors increases, eciency and AD
decrease, and AC and FOS increase. The intuition is that observation errors do not cancel out
across plots, but are persistent. High spatial correlation reduces the probability of participation
for a given N and therefore adversely impacts the policy objectives. A larger required project scale
would mitigate the eects of spatial correlation but will not eliminate it if the correlation is driven
partly by common unobservable factors at the national scale.
3.2 Policy 2: discounting the payment per hectare
In the analysis above, the payment per hectare pc was assumed to be equal to the marginal exter-
nality from deforestation . This section analyzes what happens to the three project objectives if
we vary pc. Reducing pc is equivalent to the practice of \oset discounting" sometimes observed
in practice in oset systems (Kollmuss et al., 2010). Under a system of discounting, fewer osets
are awarded than the environmental gains represented by the dierence between the baseline and
the actual forest level. Many people promote this as a way to correct for spurious osets.24 First,
we discuss the impact of changing pc in a single-plot model. Then, we analyze how these results
change in a multiple-plot model using numerical simulations.
It is straightforward that, independent of scale, any pc 6=  is less ecient if " = 0. All
entities get assigned the true baseline, and paying less than  reduces eciency, because entities
with average returns ((rj0  r  ) > pc) would opt out. Paying more than  (a \premium"
23Results for the N(0;1) distribution are similar. The eciency loss from high spatial correlation is relatively lower
compared to the central case.
24Schneider (2009a and 2009b), Chung (2007), Environmental Defense Fund (2007), and Greenpeace and Papua New
Guinea (2008) all propose discounting as a way to reduce non-additionality or spurious osets.
19Table 2: The impact of spatially correlated returns and observation errors: N = 1 and N = 100.
fr(r)  N( 1;1).
1-plot 100-plot 100-plot 100-plot 100-plot " = 0
r = " = 0 r = " = 0:5 r = " = 0:9 r = " = 0:99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eciency gain 1.33 2.47 2.41 2.02 1.59 2.53
AC 0.91 0.51 0.52 0.61 0.80 0.50
FOS 45.29% 1.86% 3.54% 17.76% 37.69% 0%
AD 5.34 8.95 8.72 7.27 5.72 9.18
TT 4.88 4.56 4.52 4.42 4.59 4.59
Opt-in 4.88% 97.47% 94.96% 78.40% 37.28% 100%
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions  = pc = 0:5. f"(")  N(0;0:5).
Eciency gains, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots. Assigned baselines are unbiased.
rather than a \discount") reduces eciency because some entities will opt in even though their
private gains from deforestation exceed the full environmental cost. This is inecient from an
economic perspective. In the single-plot model with full and symmetric information, the change
in eciency relative to a no policy case was given in (1). A simple application of Leibniz' Rule
yields that eciency is maximized when pc = . We will now investigate if this result changes with
asymmetric information - i.e. when " > 0.
3.2.1 Discounting in the single-plot model
In the single-plot model, the introduction of observation error does not change the conclusion that












Proposition 2. In the single-plot model, eciency is maximized for pc = , regardless of f"(").
Proof. The rst order condition is given by
d(S(pc))










f" (")d" > 0 for any f"(") and fr(pc)  0, eciency is maximized when
pc = .
20We now investigate what happens to the other policy objectives as the payment pc varies.
Proposition 3. AD, MT, IT, and TT are globally (weakly) increasing in pc; FOS is globally






























fr (pc)  0 8pc. The derivative of IT (second term








fr (r)dr  0 8pc. Hence, the derivative of TT w.r.t. pc
















fr (r)dr. Since the denominator is monotonically (weakly) increasing in pc, FOS
is monotonically (weakly) decreasing in pc.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that, contrary to the intended eect, the fraction of osets that is
spurious, FOS, increases when the oset price is discounted (i.e., reduced): as pc falls the share of
osets that is spurious rises toward 1.
The eect of changing pc on AC is ambiguous. Since AD is bounded, very high values of pc
will lead to increasing AC. For intermediate values of pc, a small increase in pc can either lead to
almost no additional deforestation, or a large increase in avoided deforestation, depending on the
specication of the return distribution fr(r). For instance, if fr(r) = 0 for r 2 [0;p], then AC will
be innite for pc  p and achieve a global minimum for some pc > p. Hence, AC can either be
increasing or decreasing in pc.
We conclude that, in the single-plot model, eciency is maximized by paying pc = . Paying
more reduces FOS, leads to more AD, but requires higher transfers. The eect on AC is ambiguous
for low values of pc, but eventually AC must increase.
3.2.2 Discounting in the multi-plot model
In the multi-plot model, pc =  no longer unambiguously maximizes eciency. The intuition is
as follows. Raising pc above  has two countervailing eects on eciency. First, it will increase
the opt-in probability. This increases eciency because it helps prevent deforestation of plots with
returns below . Second, it causes certain forest to be ineciently prevented from deforestation.
The relative strength of these channels determines whether a higher pc can be more ecient than
pc = . A lower pc will never increase eciency, since it will both reduce opt-in and cause inecient
21deforestation. The eects go in the same direction. Hence, pc   maximizes eciency in the
multiple-plot model. Figure 7 illustrates this when  = 0:5 and N = 10 or 100, and also shows the
impact of discounting on other criteria.
Figure 7 shows that raising pc above  can increase eciency. For N = 10, raising pc above  (to
pc = 0.6) slightly increases eciency. Hence, eciency is no longer maximized at pc = . However,
when N = 100, the opt-in probability at pc =  is already almost ecient at 97.47%. Raising pc
to 0.6 increases opt-in only slightly to 98.93%. Hence, we nd that the most ecient solution is
sometimes achieved for pc > . This increased eciency coincides with higher AC, however. The
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Figure 7: The impact of changing pc and project scale on eciency and opt-in (left panel) and
on AC and FOS (right panel), for fr(r)  N( 1;1),  = 0:5, N = 10 and 100.
In summary, we nd that eciency considerations never justify discounting the payment pc
below the environmental damage . Setting pc >  can be justied if opt-in at pc =  is below
100%, but this eciency increase comes at the expense of higher average cost. Since increasing
scale leads to full opt-in in the limit, pc =  always becomes the most ecient payment as N
approaches innity. There always exists a p0 (p0 > ) such that eciency falls and transfers rise for
any p > p0. In that price region, eciency decreases while transfers increase. For choices pc > ,
the tradeo between eciency and average cost remains.
Analogous to Proposition 3 for the single-plot model, FOS (and opt-in) unambiguously become
more favorable as pc increases. If an entity had a favorable baseline at pc, it would have chosen to
opt in. At a higher price pc +, the entity will still opt in but no additional spurious osets will be
generated. Hence, raising the price does not increase the number of spurious osets while it does
increase AD, leading to a reduced FOS.
Hence, we conclude that restoring environmental integrity of osets is not a valid reason to
advocate oset discounting. Discounting does however, almost always, reduce the average cost of
22osets. If the discounted price is achieved by limiting demand (e.g., limiting the number of osets
that can enter the market), so that buyers pay less than the market price for a unit that is then
fully fungible with other units (i.e., a 1:1 trading ratio without downward adjustment of the cap,
as is the case in the Clean Development Mechanism), buyers will reap gains and the environmental
outcome will be negative. If however the gains to industrialized countries are spent on additional
mitigation (as it is with (t : 1;t > 1) trading ratios) this could have a positive environmental eect
even if the cap is not adjusted.25 This might however be more eciently achieved through changes
in baselines.
3.3 Policy 3: changing the generosity of the assigned baseline
Another policy choice for the regulator is to set a baseline that is, in expectation, too high or too
low. In other words, the government assigns the following baselines for plot i
d BLi =
(
1 if b ri  r
0 if b ri > r
)
(16)
where r is a specied return set by the government. The government, aware of adverse selection,
may try to pay only landowners who are most likely to deforest in the baseline, for instance by
choosing pc > r > 0. Assuming pc = , we analyze the impact of this policy change on the
various criteria: eciency, AD, AC and FOS. To provide intuition, we rst discuss the impact in
the context of the single-plot model. Then, we present numerical simulations of the multiple-plot
model.
3.3.1 Changing baselines in the single-plot model
Proposition 4. More generous baselines (weakly) increase eciency and AD, but require a (weakly)
higher TT.









fr (r)dr. By Leibniz' Rule, this expression is globally weakly decreasing in r. Hence, e-

















fr (r)dr, which is also globally weakly decreasing in r.
25Note that, if trading ratios are used without adjusting the cap, the environmental eect could be negative even
for large t. A straightforward example is a returns distribution with positive probability mass below zero, but no
probability mass between 0 and pc.
23The eect on FOS is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the baseline error distribution.
Using (9) and (10), FOS = OS=AD = IT=TT is decreasing in r if and only if MT=IT is in-



















(1   F"(r   r))fr (r)dr=
0 R
 1
(1   F"(r   r))fr (r)dr. If this expression is increasing in r, FOS
is decreasing in baseline stringency. This condition will certainly hold if the baseline error is bounded
from above.
The fact that eciency increases as the baseline becomes more generous is not surprising, since
in the limit this is equivalent to assigning a no-forest baseline or a subsidy of pc per hectare of
forest standing. As discussed in Section 2, such a subsidy is indeed ecient but requires a large
infra-marginal transfer.
Using (10) and making OS and AD functions of r we can see that the eect of r on AC is
also ambiguous. OS, the amount of spurious osets, is decreasing in r, but so is AD. The shape
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Figure 8: The impact of baseline generosity on the project objectives for the central case.
Figure 8 shows that for reasonable returns distributions like our central case, FOS and AC
are both decreasing in r (as baselines become more stringent). For very stringent baselines FOS
24becomes negative: the environmental gains are greater than the number of traded osets. Eciency,
lower average cost and oset quality are conicting policy aims for this policy option also: eciency
requires setting r low (generous baseline), while minimizing average cost and maximizing oset
quality requires setting r high (stringent baseline).
3.3.2 Changing baselines in the multiple-plot model
The conclusions from the single-plot model also hold in the multiple-plot model. Figure 9 illustrates
the eect of assigning baselines that are too (un)favorable in expectation for the central case returns
distribution. The true baseline equals 84 (84 out of 100 plots will remain forested in absence of a
policy). The gure shows that increasing the baseline (i.e., making it less favorable) unambiguously
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Figure 9: The impact of changing baseline generosity on the project objectives, for fr(r) 
N( 1;1) and N = 100. 84 is an unbiased baseline.
This section has shown that only increasing project scale improves all objectives simultaneously
(for \typical" returns distributions). Discounting osets and changing baseline generosity aect
the objectives in opposing directions. Discounting osets reduces eciency, AD and oset quality,
but improves the value for money for funders. Making assigned baselines more stringent reduces
eciency and AD, but improves quality and value. This illustrates the conicting nature of these
25policy objectives. It also illustrates that tightening the baseline should be favored over oset
discounting if environmental integrity of osets is a key policy concern and not enough of the
gains to industrialized countries from discounting are spent on additional mitigation (e.g. through
trading ratios and/or reducing the cap) to counteract the fall in oset quality.
Table 3 provides a summary of the impact of the various policy options on the policy objectives
discussed in this paper.
Table 3: The eects of the various policy options on the policy objectives.
Policy option Policy criteria
Required Maximize Maximize oset Maximize value Maximize
scale eciency quality for money avoided
of project (minimize FOS) (minimize AC) deforestation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Increase Finite N (+) (+) (+) (+)
scale N ! 1 + + + +
Raise price N = 1   + ( ) +
above  N > 1 First +, then   + ( ) +
Lower price Any     (+)  
below 
(\discount")
Generous Any + ( ) ( ) +
baseline
Stringent Any   (+) (+)  
baseline
Notes: + indicates a favorable eect; - indicates an unfavorable eect; round brackets indicate that the eect holds
for \reasonable" distributions but is theoretically ambiguous.
4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper built a model of landowner decisions and a voluntary avoided deforestation program. It
demonstrated the tradeo between three key policy criteria: eciency, value (minimizing average
cost to industrialized countries) and quality of osets, when there is asymmetric information. It
analyzed the eects of increasing the scale of required projects including when returns are spatially
correlated. It then explored the eects on the three policy criteria of two other policy levers: oset
discounting (reducing the payment per hectare to below the value of the environmental externality)
and changing the baseline.
26We have four main ndings. First, under almost all circumstances, voluntary deforestation
programs (or, in fact, general oset programs) will perform better with increased required scale of
project. Second, oset discounting and setting more stringent baselines highlight the tradeos in-
volved in policy design: ecient policy may involve high transfers that make the policy unattractive
to the industrialized countries which will fund them. Both policies reduce eciency but generally
raise value. Moreover, there is still an eciency gain relative to no policy. Third, discounting lowers
the quality of osets and does not improve the environmental outcome, at least if not accompanied
by a suciently high trading ratio. In some cases, even a high trading ratio leads to a worse en-
vironmental outcome. Therefore, the main rationale for oset discounting is to raise the value of
the policy to industrialized countries. Fourth, making baselines more stringent does increase the
quality of osets.
Our key messages for policy makers are three. First, make 'projects' as large as possible.
Regional or national scale programs where funds or osets are transferred to the government on
the basis of aggregated regional or national monitoring data will be much more ecient and oer
better value for money. Although baseline deforestation rates are still dicult to predict at the
national or regional scale, the errors fall dramatically relative to small scale prediction.
Second, recognize that the primary purpose of oset discounting or below market prices is to
reduce the cost to industrialized countries so that paying for avoided deforestation becomes an
attractive mitigation option for them. It actually increases the share of funds that go to spurious
osets and reduces eciency. Discounting can only be justied on environmental integrity grounds
if the trading ratio with \regular" cap-and-trade credits compensates for the loss of oset quality. In
that case, discounting can extract rents from sellers to pay for additional environmental protection.
The use of baselines more stringent than business as usual typically does reduce the number and
fraction of spurious osets while simultaneously reducing the cost to industrialized countries, but
reduces eciency.
Third, invest in research to improve understanding of local and global deforestation drivers. This
will allow more accurate assessment of returns distributions and their evolution and hence more
accurate prediction of baseline deforestation. Moreover, this will help identify domestic policies to
eectively control deforestation.
This paper has highlighted the tradeos involved in various policy design options for avoiding
deforestation. In future work, we will present a framework in which industrialized and forest-
covered developing countries can explore these trade-os, subject to the restriction that the policy
has to be individually rational for both parties. By dening the Pareto ecient bargaining set we
can explore its determinants and give guidance to policy makers who may seek to expand the set
and to negotiators who want to nd agreements within the set (and in their countries' favor).
If countries can be encouraged to be more generous, by pushing less to lower the average cost
of (real) osets or by accepting more stringent baselines, it will be easier to create an ecient
27international framework to avoid deforestation. Combined with eective domestic policies that
respond to the international incentives, this could meet the expectations of those who promote
avoided deforestation as a key climate mitigation option in the short term.
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